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EXECUTIVE PRIMACY, POPULISM,
AND PUBLIC LAW
Peter Cane*
Abstract: As the articles in this Symposium suggest, populism and
authoritarianism present ongoing challenges not only to liberal democracy but also to its
legal underpinnings. Manipulation, avoidance, evasion, and outright rejection of the
constitutional and legal frameworks of liberal democracy are features of populist
authoritarianism. The basic argument of this article is that liberal-democratic public law
and legal theory no longer satisfy human needs and desires because they were conceived
in worlds that no longer exist, when the main pre-occupation was to secure liberty, not
equality. The aim of the article is to explain the inherited structure of our public law and
theory and the main events and developments that have produced this mismatch between
public law and social aspiration.
Cite as: Peter Cane, Executive Primacy, Populism, and Public Law, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J.
527 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Public law provides a “rule-based,” or “normative,” framework for the
practice of politics by creating a concept of public, legal power and specifying
how public power is to be allocated, exercised, and controlled.1 In any given
place and at any specified time, the fit between public law and political
practice may be more or less tight depending on whether, and to what extent,
factors other than “formal” law frame and shape the “informal” practice of
politics.
In the Western tradition of public-law scholarship, the body of formal,
public law is divided between three major categories: constitutional law,
administrative law, and international law. In the “globalised” present, the last
category is evolving to accommodate concepts such as “supranational” law
and “transnational” law. In the common law strand of the Western legal
tradition,2 dividing the law into categories or “areas”—sometimes called
* Senior Research Fellow, Christ’s College, Cambridge; Emeritus Distinguished Professor, Australian
National University. This paper was first presented at an Advanced Workshop on The Resurgence of
Executive Primacy in the Age of Populism’ organized by Associate Research Professor Cheng-Yi Huang,
held at the Institutum Jurisprudentiae of the Academia Sinica, Taipei. Many thanks to Cheng-Yi and the
Institute for generous hospitality, to the participants in the Workshop for stimulating comments and
conversation, and for the Editors of the Journal for careful editing.
1
See generally CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS (2011), for a sophisticated
theory along these lines.
2
But see JOHN HENRY, MERRYMAN & ROGELIO AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 91–101 (3d ed. 2007),
(explaining the civil law strand).
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“taxonomy”—is a relatively recent phenomenon. As a substantive category of
law, constitutional law could be traced back to the American and French
Revolutions in the late-eighteenth century. International law matured in the
nineteenth century as the nation-state became the basic unit of political
organisation in North America, Europe, and elsewhere. Administrative law is
a product of the growth of bureaucracy from the latter half of the nineteenth
century. The practices of politics have changed significantly since the time the
formal conceptual structure of these areas of law was built. This article is
about the fit between inherited paradigms of public law and two features of
contemporary political practice that are the subject of this Symposium issue:
“executive primacy” and “populism.” The basic argument will be that
classical public law theory and formal public law do not fit well with such
phenomena. The article will focus on the United Kingdom and the United
States, although the discussion may have wider resonance and relevance.3
The article has several parts. Part II provides definitions of “executive
primacy” and “populism.” Part III tells a story about the development of
governance in Europe up to the end of the seventeenth century. Part IV
describes the beginnings of the modern, Western, scholarly, public law
tradition. Parts V to X outline significant changes in political practices since
the foundations of public law scholarship. Part XI briefly describes some
reactions to the resulting lack of fit between formal public law and informal
political practice. Part XII concludes with a provocation.
II.

EXECUTIVE PRIMACY AND POPULISM

What do “executive primacy” and “populism” mean? In this article,
“executive primacy” refers to a situation in which the executive branch of the
government4 can exercise greater political control over the legislature and the
judiciary than the legislature and judiciary, either separately or together, can
exercise over the executive.5 So, for instance, in the U.K. system, the

3

See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM (Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017)
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK] (Part II Regions). It is well recognised in the literature that populism, for
instance, may take different forms in different places and at different times. And, of course, public law differs
from one jurisdiction to another.
4
For instance, the President in the United States, or the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the United
Kingdom.
5
Professor Huang offers a compatible definition in his article in this Symposium: “By ‘executive
primacy,’ I mean the leading and dominant role of the executive branch, especially the chief executives,
either presidents or prime ministers, to control political agenda on policy issues or constitutional
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executive government in power can normally control Parliament much more
effectively than Parliament can control the executive. Furthermore, by virtue
of its ability to control Parliament, the executive typically has the upper hand
in contests between itself and the courts, whose decisions can be reversed by
Parliamentary legislation (the production of which the executive can normally
control). By contrast, in the United States, the relationships between the
President, Congress, and the Supreme Court are more evenly balanced and,
consequently, prone to instability as the various institutions compete with one
another for the upper hand.6
The term “populism” is used in many different senses. Rovira
Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, and Ostiguy identify three main politicalscience approaches to populism: a “political-strategic approach,” a “sociocultural approach,” and an “ideational approach.”7 The political-strategic
approach defines populism as a political strategy by which “a political actor
captures the government and makes and enforces authoritative decisions . . .
populism revolves around the opportunism of personalistic plebiscitarian
leaders.”8 Under the socio-cultural approach, populism “is characterized by a
particular form of political relationship between political leaders and a social
basis [sic]” understood in terms of a contrast between “high” and “low.”
Populism is “the flaunting of the low.”9 In this high-low polarity, the high
appeals to “formal, impersonal, legalistic, institutionally mediated models of
authority” while the low appeals to “personalistic, strong (often male) models
of authority . . . . The personalist pole generally claims to be much closer to
‘the people’ and to represent them better than those advocating a more
impersonal, procedural, proper model of authority.”10
Under the ideational approach, populism is understood as “an ideology
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which
interpretation.” Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive Primacy, 28 WASH. INT’L
L.J. 395, 400 (2019).
6
See PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COMPARISON 24–111
(2016), for detailed elaboration of this contrast.
7
Critobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., Populism, An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 14.
8
Kurt Weyland, Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at
55. I take a “personalistic plebiscitarian leader” to be one who appeals to the electorate on the basis of the
leader’s personal character and aspirations rather than broad programs of action or concrete policies.
9
Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 73.
10
Id. at 81–82.
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argues that politics should be an expression of the . . . general will . . . of the
people.”11 These various approaches identify what may be considered the
three basic features of populism: political dominance; a particular relationship
between the populist and “the people” (or “civil society” or “the governed”);
and a particular set of relationships between the populist and other
governmental institutions.
As these various approaches suggest, the term “populism” is often used
negatively and pejoratively. But it may also be deployed positively and
approvingly to express the idea that “the people” should, in some sense,
ultimately control the government, rather than vice-versa. It is used in this
way by U.S. legal scholars, Larry Kramer12 and Frank Michelman,13 who
wrote about what might be called “popular” constitutionalism (good) as
opposed to “populist” constitutionalism (bad).14 In terms of this contrast,
populist constitutionalism may be understood as a perversion or pathology of
popular constitutionalism. This article is primarily concerned with populist
constitutionalism (or simply “populism,” in contrast to “popular
constitutionalism”) understood as a set of political ideas, behaviours, and
strategies used by politicians to secure executive office and primacy. Populist
constitutionalism is often associated with twentieth-century decolonialisation, first of European empires (particularly in Africa and South
America) and later (after 1989) of the Soviet Empire (particularly in Eastern
Europe). So understood, populism represents a transitional political
phenomenon in a journey (that may never be completed) to liberal
democracy—“popular constitutionalism.” However, populist practices have
also been identified in well-established, stable, liberal-democratic states such
as the United Kingdom and the United States, which are the focus of this
article. The article is not about executive primacy and populism as such, but
11

Critobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., supra note 7, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 29.
STEPHEN KOTKIN & LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
13
Frank Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 64–98 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). According to Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy,
the great bulk of writing on populism since 1990, except in relation to the United States, has been by political
scientists. See Critobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., supra note 7, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 10–
13. It is in this context that they cite Kramer and Michelman.
14
We can take “constitutionalism” as referring to an idea that because “power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely,” public power must be limited in the interests of those subject to it. See Joseph
Lowndes, Populism in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 232–46 (suggesting that
the strong republican tradition of popular sovereignty in the United States blurs the line between the two
forms of constitutionalism and affects the form that populism takes. The author also suggests that the
diffusion of power characteristic of the U.S. system hinders certain populist strategies, such as concentration,
in the populist’s hands, of control over all governmental functions).
12
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about the lack of fit between inherited paradigms of formal public law and
contemporary political practices such as executive primacy and populism.
The first step is to sketch briefly a backstory to the development of the
inherited paradigms of public law.
III.

A BACKSTORY

Here is a very simplistic, stylised historical story about government.
The purpose of the story is not to describe what actually happened in any
particular place at any particular time. The aim, rather, is to suggest to the
reader a historically informed way of thinking about, and making some sort
of sense of, events that did happen. That said, there is good reason to think
that every element of the story can be found in some form or other in many
places and at various times.
The dominant form of political organisation in Europe from the late
medieval period to the early modern period15 was monarchy—one-person
governance. In terms of the title of this article, monarchy is “executive
primacy” in its strongest form, and “absolute” monarchy is that institution’s
strongest form. Today, we tend to conceptualize legislation as the most
important legal tool of governance and, consequently, the legislature as the
prime organ of government. However, a strong case can be made that the
fundamental task of government in any polity is not only making general laws
(“legislating”), but “running the country” (let us call this “administration”). In
political theory, the “minimal” or “night-watch”16 government keeps the
peace internally, within the polity, and provides security from attack by
external forces, but does little else.17 Making general laws is an expensive,
resource-intensive activity; typically, before governors start making general
rules to mould the behaviour of the governed to fit their own “policy
preferences” (to use modern jargon), they keep the peace by enforcing
“customary law”—law that has developed in the course of, and as a result of,
social practice, from the bottom up, rather than having been “made” and
imposed on social practice, from the top down.18 One tool of enforcement is
15

Say, roughly, from the beginning of the twelfth century to the end of the seventeenth century.
More commonly called the “night-watchman state.”
17
See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), for the classic, modern
exposition of this basic idea.
18
See generally 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (2013) for a classic, theoretical
exposition of this contrast between “spontaneous” law and “manufactured” law.
16
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the use of coercive force against recalcitrant law-breakers. Another is
resolution of disputes, about what the law is and how it applies to particular
situations, backed up, if necessary, by coercive force. Adjudication—
settlement by judges and courts of disputes about what the law is and how it
applies in particular circumstances—begins as an aspect of administration,
even before legislation is (much) used as a tool of governance.19
In a monarchy, the various tools of governance—including legislation
and adjudication—are more-or-less effectively controlled by the monarch.
The central task of the government is “administration.” In very small political
units, the “governor” may be able to undertake all administrative tasks
personally. In monarchical polities of any size, however, in order to
administer effectively, the monarch needs assistants to help run the polity.
These assistants “execute” or “implement” royal policy. In a monarchy, the
monarch effectively controls this “executive,” which includes what we would
now call ministers (or “secretaries”) of state, bureaucrats, and judges. In a
regime of one-person rule, if there is a body that we might now call a
“legislature,” typically it will effectively be part of the executive. Its basic task
will be to help the monarch to run the country by, for instance, supplying
resources the monarch needs to implement policy, approving general rules
proposed by the ruler, and adjudicating disputes between the government and
individual citizens (hearing “petitions” we might say) on the monarch’s
behalf.20 In this monarchical world, all the various “powers” of the
government are located in one person, and that person effectively controls all
the officials and institutions that exercise those powers on the ruler’s behalf
and as the ruler’s agents or delegates. The monarch (personally or through
agents and delegates) can exercise all of these powers “unilaterally” without
the need for the formal consent of or formal ratification by any other official
or body.21

19
See generally R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1988), for
an account of the early growth of the English common law.
20
CANE, supra note 6, at 380–88 (explaining that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
guarantees the right to petition for the redress of grievances. Until well into the twentieth century, the U.S.
Congress entertained individual claims for compensation against the U.S. government). See also Maggie
McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L. J. 1538 (2018).
21
The modern, post-Enlightenment, secular version of monarchy is dictatorship. Historically,
monarchical power was often legitimised by appeals to divine authority. Today, we refer to regimes in which
the leadership claims such divine support as “theocracies.” See, e.g., Yvonne Tew, Stealth Theocracy, 58
VA. J. INT’L L. 31 (2018); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, CONSTITUTING RELIGION: ISLAM, LIBERAL RIGHTS, AND THE
MALAYSIAN STATE (2018). A dictator is a sole leader who claims no god-given authority.
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In European history, monarchical government went through a long
process of evolutionary and revolutionary development over the period we are
talking about—and beyond. An early revolutionary change took place in
England in the sixteenth century when Henry VIII declared that he, not the
Pope in Rome, was head of the English Church, thus concentrating supreme,
sacred, and secular power in the same hands and removing the Papacy as a
political competitor.22 This encouraged the Stuart monarchs, James I and
Charles I, in the early seventeenth century, to claim not only that the monarch
alone was the rightful “sovereign” ruler of the country, but also that the
monarch governed by “Divine right” in the name of God.23 Such bids for
divinely-ordained power precipitated a Civil War, which ushered in a shortlived English republic without a monarch.24 However, things did not go very
well in the new republic, and after a few years (in 1660) the monarchy was
“restored.” James II, the brother of the restored Charles II, succeeded in 1685.
Suspicion that James, a Roman Catholic, wanted to re-assert claims of
sovereign rule by Divine right led to the so-called “Glorious Revolution” of
1688, involving a change of monarch and a radical re-adjustment of political
power-relationships at the heart of government.25
IV.

MONTESQUIEU AND LOCKE

This is a good point in the story to introduce Charles Secondat, the
Baron Montesquieu (commonly called “Montesquieu”), a French aristocrat.
He lived in England for about two years around 1730 at a time when the new
political dispensation ushered in by the Glorious Revolution was bedding
down. The roots of modern Western constitutionalism (in the Anglosphere,
anyway) are often traced back to his work and ideas and to those of the
seventeenth-century English philosopher, John Locke.26 Here, we are
particularly concerned with their theories about “separation of powers.” All
that need be said about Locke is that (in modern terms) he imagined two
22

The power over which Henry and the Pope initially fought was the power to dissolve a marriage—
specifically, Henry’s to Catherine of Aragon. However, this dispute became part of a larger project of
strengthening the position of the English monarchy against the Papacy, asserting royal power over
ecclesiastical courts and extending the dominance of English law over Canon law. The dispute was exploited
by Protestant religious reformers who wanted the English church to break from the Roman church primarily
for theological rather than secular reasons. Henry VIII was the first monarch to appoint non-clerics to the
highest bureaucratic posts. Thomas Cromwell succeeded Cardinal Wolsey as Henry’s right-hand man.
23
C.R. LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY: A SURVEY 282–336 (1962).
24
The “President” of the so-called English “Commonwealth” was Oliver Cromwell.
25
LOVELL, supra note 23, at 361–414.
26
See generally M.J.C VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing Locke’s ideas).
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governmental powers: the legislative and the executive, the latter divided into
two—one concerned with domestic affairs and the other with foreign affairs.
He subsumed what we would now call the “judicial power” under executive
power. This association of the executive and judicial powers reflected the fact
that, after the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the English courts were
staffed by senior royal officials whose task was to assist the monarch in
maintaining peace and consolidating power by resolving disputes between
citizens and between citizens and the monarch.27 Executive power and judicial
power were both understood in terms of applying and enforcing law, either in
aid of “running the country” or in the service of resolving individual disputes.
A.

A Necessary Clarification

Before we go any further, it is necessary to point out a troublesome
ambiguity in the use of the word “executive” to describe a governmental
institution and a governmental function (or “power”). In one common usage,
an “executive” implements policies and plans formulated by someone else (or,
perhaps, by the executive acting in the distinct capacity of policy-maker).
“Execution” in this sense is one function of “the executive branch of
government,” but by no means the only one. Another function is well-captured
in the U.S. terminology of “the (Trump) Administration,” as opposed to “the
(Trump) Executive.” This usage alerts us to two important facts. The first is
that whatever we may say about adjudication and resolving individual
disputes,28 “running the country” according to law requires and allows
exercise by the ruler of very considerable creativity and discretion.29 It is not
merely a matter of mechanically “implementing the (letter of the) law.”
Secondly, in all governmental systems, it has been found necessary to
give the person(s) responsible for running the country significant legal
freedom to act “unilaterally” without the formal consent or prior approval of
other governmental institutions. In English constitutional law, such power is

27

See generally VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 19.
One of the longest-running theoretical debates in legal theory concerns the extent to which judges
and courts are “bound” by law made by others and the extent to which, in deciding cases, they exercise
“discretion” unbounded by law—in other words “make law.” Perhaps the most famous modern work on this
topic is R.M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1998). As we will see, in Montesquieu’s account, courts
mechanically apply law made by others.
29
There are some areas of activity, such as defence and foreign affairs, in which governments typically
enjoy a very significant measure of discretion uncontrolled by legislatures or courts. The judicial “political
questions” doctrine refers to such areas.
28
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called “prerogative” because it originally belonged to the monarch.30 In U.S.
law, to the extent that they are consistent with the Constitution, “Presidential
orders” of various sorts provide a method by which the President can legally
act unilaterally.31 Because the terminology is so deeply entrenched, it would
be impossible in this article not to refer to one of the branches of government
as “the executive.” However, for the reasons just given, it is better to refer to
the power and function characteristic of that branch more broadly, as
“administrative,” rather than more narrowly, as “executive.” For present
purposes, the idea of “administration” includes that of “execution,” but not
vice-versa.
B.

Montesquieu and the Separation of Powers in England
1.

What Montesquieu Saw

We can now go back to Montesquieu, who has a strong claim to be
called the father (or, at least, the grandfather) of modern constitutional law
and theory. His views were highly influential as soon as they were published,
and they remain so today, not only in Anglo-American constitutional
discourse, but more-or-less universally.32 For this reason, we need to look at
his work in some detail.
Montesquieu is most closely identified with the “doctrine” of
“separation of powers,” which is primarily concerned with relationships
between governmental institutions. Montesquieu’s theory of separation of
powers is contained in Book XI, chapters 5 and 6, of The Spirit of the Laws,
first published in 1748.33 Montesquieu argued that, in every government, there
are three sorts of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—and that there
can be no liberty when the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or in the same body of “magistrates,”34 or if the judicial power is
not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Montesquieu claimed
that England was the one country in the world that had political liberty as the
direct purpose of its constitution, although he left open the question of whether
30

See PETER CANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55–56 (5th ed. 2011).
See Huang, supra note 5, at 424–25.
32
See VILE, supra note 26, at Ch. 4; Heidi Klug, The Constitution in Comparative Perspective, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Mark Tushnet, et. al. eds., 2015).
33
The edition cited in this article is MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne Cohler et al. eds.,
trans., 1989) [hereafter MONTESQUIEU 1989].
34
By which Montesquieu meant public officials.
31
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it achieved its objective.35 Montesquieu identified two liberty-promoting
characteristics of the English Constitution. The first was its “mixture” (or
“sharing”) of the power to legislate. The English legislature, he observed, had
three elements: the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons.
Each of these elements gave a voice to a different “estate” or “interest” or
“constituency.” The King or Queen (“the Crown”) participated in the
legislative process in his or her capacity as monarch, the aristocracy
participated through the House of Lords, and the “ordinary” people through
their representatives in the House of Commons. In this respect, England had
a system of “mixed government” in which power was shared amongst various
“socio-political” interests.
The second characteristic identified by Montesquieu was the way the
English system “separated” legislative, executive, and judicial power from
one another, and associated each with a different institution and set of public
officials: the legislative with the monarch-in-Parliament,36 the executive with
the monarch, and the judicial with (independent) courts. In terms of
Montesquieu’s personal, ideological agenda—reform of the French system to
maintain and strengthen the power of the aristocracy as a check on the
monarchy37—he was more interested in the English Constitution’s sharing of
legislative power amongst three (socio-political) “estates of the realm”
(“mixed government”) than in its allocation of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions respectively to separate institutions. Nevertheless, it is on
his account of, and faith in, separation of powers as a guarantee of political
liberty that his enduring influence rests.38
Montesquieu’s account of the English system effectively captured the
essence of the English (“Glorious”) Revolution of 1688. In the medieval
period, before the Revolution, all the levers of government—executive,
judicial, and legislative—were, to a greater or lesser extent, in the hands of
35

See D.W. CARRITHERS, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS BY MONTESQUIEU 77 (1977) (explaining that
Montesquieu’s travel notes, written much earlier than The Spirit of the Laws, he paints a rather dark picture
of English life).
36
The monarch, the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting in concert.
37
CARRITHERS, supra note 35, at 78.
38
The distinction between socio-political distribution of power (“mixed government”), and
institutional/functional distribution of power (separation of powers) has been effectively written out of the
discourse of Western constitutionalism. As a result, some of the most radical critiques of Western
constitutionalism (such as Marxist socialism) focus on the impact of governmental arrangements on the
interests of various socio-political groups. In contemporary Western constitutionalist thought, “mixed
government” is seen, at most, as an evolutionary step on the way to institutional/functional separation of
powers. See infra Part VIII.
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the monarch. In fact, no clear distinctions were drawn between the various
powers and functions of government. Government bureaucrats were, literally,
servants of the Crown. The judges of the “'common-law” courts39 enjoyed a
significant measure of day-to-day independence from royal control, but were
appointed to, and sustained in, office at royal will and pleasure; summary
dismissal of judges who incurred royal displeasure was by no means
unknown.40 Alongside adjudication in their own courts, common-law judges
were integrally involved in both legislative and executive activities, advising
both the monarch and the houses of Parliament. They also participated in the
judicial affairs of the “conciliar” courts (most prominently, the Court of Star
Chamber), which were much more closely controlled by the monarch than
were the common-law courts: they were manifestations of the monarch’s
“Privy Council,” not “independent” bodies. As for the legislature (the House
of Commons and the House of Lords), in the ordinary course of things, when
major war was not being waged, the personal and prerogative (official) wealth
of the monarch was sufficient to finance the affairs of state without the need
to ask Parliament for funds. In peacetime, the main role of the two Houses
was to support the monarch in running the country by rubber-stamping royal
policies and addressing citizens’ grievances.
The effects of the 1688 Revolution on public law were dramatic.
Parliament (more particularly the lower house of Parliament, the House of
Commons) successfully established itself as “sovereign.” Rather than
continuing to provide executive support to the monarch, Parliament
effectively became the monarch’s boss; and the monarch, in turn, became
Parliament’s chief executive. Parliament held the purse-strings of government
and decided who would be monarch. The monarch retained the power to veto
(“refuse assent to”) legislation that had been passed, in turn, by each of the
House of Commons and the House of Lords (the upper house of Parliament);
but this power was used for the last time in 1704 and gradually, thereafter, lost
all political significance, even as a threat. As chief executive, the monarch
retained the power to hire and fire the monarchy’s most senior administrative
assistants—ministers of state—and other bureaucrats. However, because the
monarch could no longer participate in Parliament’s daily proceedings, he or
That is, the courts of King’s/Queen’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. The common-law
courts were distinguished from other courts such as the Chancery Court, the Admiralty Court, ecclesiastical
courts and (until 1641) conciliar courts. Conciliar courts were staffed by the monarch and members of the
monarch’s inner (“Privy”) Council. Introduced by the Tudors in the sixteenth century, they were particularly
involved in dealing with crimes against the state and misbehaviour by government officials.
40
Most famously, perhaps, Sir Edward Coke was dismissed by James I from the post of Chief Justice
of the Court of King’s Bench in 1616.
39

538

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 2

she became increasingly dependent on his or her ministers of state to protect
royal interests from attack in the newly-independent House of Commons.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, this proto-“Cabinet” gradually
became more and more independent of royal control to the point where, by
the middle of the nineteenth century, it was effectively answerable to the
House of Commons, not the monarch. At this time, the monarch ceased to
have an effective choice about who would form the government.
As for the judiciary, the conciliar courts had been abolished as early as
1641, and the House of Lords (the upper house of the legislature) had taken
over the domestic appellate jurisdiction formerly exercised by the monarch’s
Privy Council.41 The Act of Settlement 1701 stripped the monarch of the
power to dismiss judges of the common-law courts. The common law judges,
once literally His or Her Majesty’s Justices, integrally involved in most
aspects of government, were now, in principle at least, marginal participants
in the project of running the country, subordinate to the will of Parliament. In
return for this change of status, they received guaranteed security of tenure
(subject only to removal by Parliament for misconduct) and salary.42
Book XI, Chapter 6 of The Spirit of the Laws charts this transition from
one system of government to another. In the pre-Revolutionary system, the
legislature and judiciary were politically subordinate to the executive, and the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers were not sharply distinguished
from one another. After the Revolution, three distinct institutions—Crown,
Parliament, and the courts—performed distinctively different characteristic
functions (executive, legislative, and judicial, respectively) and were
relatively independent of and, as a result, interdependent on, one another.
Parliament, rather than the monarch, was now sovereign (politically
dominant). National political power, formerly concentrated in the monarch,
was diffused amongst the various institutions of government.

41
The Privy Council retained jurisdiction over British colonies because establishing colonies was
understood to be an exercise of the Royal Prerogative (to conduct external affairs) and so, appropriately the
subject of royal prerogative jurisdiction. By the end of the nineteenth century, the “Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council” was hearing hundreds of appeals a year from all corners of the British Empire (on which, at
that time it was said, “the sun never set”).
42
See CANE, supra note 6, at 29–36.
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What Montesquieu Missed

However, although Montesquieu gave a good account of what had
changed, he did not understand how much had remained the same. First,
contrary to what he seems to have thought, the monarch had not been reduced
to a mere executor of Parliament’s will. The monarchy retained its
“prerogative” powers of unilateral action. Some of these (such as the power
to make law without Parliamentary concurrence and the power to judge
individual legal disputes) had been stripped away in the seventeenth century,43
but many (such as the power to wage war) survived the Revolution.44 It was
now accepted that Parliament could abrogate or curtail those surviving
prerogative powers, and that their existence and continuance depended on
recognition by the judiciary. Subject to that, however, the monarch still had
much room for discretionary action in major matters of state. For instance,
establishing colonies was understood to be an exercise of the royal prerogative
to conduct foreign affairs. The British Empire, in its various forms between
the seventeenth and the mid-twentieth centuries, was—technically, if not
actually—a royal, not a Parliamentary, project.
Secondly, Montesquieu failed to understand the role of the common
law courts. He seems to have thought that judicial power was effectively
exercised by citizen juries; the judicial function consisted merely of
mechanically applying the law.45 The reality was quite different. For one
thing, until the nineteenth century, courts were a much more important source
of law—both “ordinary” and “constitutional,”46 private and public—than
43
See Case of Proclamations, [1611] 77 Eng. Rep. 1352; 12 Co. Rep. 74 (ending the monarchical
legislation); Case of Prohibitions, [1607] 77 Eng. Rep. 1342; 12 Co. Rep. 63 (ending monarchical
adjudication outside the conciliar courts, which were, in turn, abolished in 1641).
44
This explains why the distinction between “execution” and “administration” is so important.
45
Montesquieu was correct that, in England, unlike Europe, trial by jury was the default process in the
common law courts (but not other courts). However, the precise task that the jury would perform in any
particular case, and the precise questions it would be required to answer, were decided by a judge. By
Montesquieu’s day, the distinction between questions of law, for the judge to decide, and questions of fact,
for the jury to decide, was well-established. According to this distinction, the judges’ job was to say what the
law was, and the jury’s job was to apply it. However, in reality this did not mean that the job of the jury in
relation to the law was purely mechanical. On the contrary, the distinction between law and fact was
developed in order to reduce the discretion of juries to decide cases in the way they saw fit. In its origins,
jury trial stood for jury discretion, and in Montesquieu’s day, juries (in some areas of the law more than
others) still had a great deal of effective discretion over law as well as fact. See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1st ed.
1990), for jury discretion in the American colonies at this time.
46
Montesquieu would have drawn no distinction between constitutional law and non-constitutional
law. It was not until the end of the century that people started to think of a “constitution” as a document that
codified (i.e., exhaustively stated) relations between governors and governed in positive legal form and that
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Parliament. The large bulk of English law had been made over the centuries
and had continued to be made in the eighteenth century by judges as a byproduct of resolving individual disputes. In this respect, the only impact of the
Revolution was to confirm47 that in case of a conflict between judicially-made
and Parliamentary law, the latter would prevail. This autonomous, inherent48
judicial power to make law (subject only to reversal by Parliament) is the
defining feature of a “common-law” legal system.
In addition, since the early sixteenth century, the common-law courts
(as opposed to the conciliar courts, which also operated in this area) had been
controlling local royal administration (undertaken predominantly by Justices
of the Peace)49 on behalf and in the name of the monarch (using “prerogative”
writs or (in U.S. jargon) “extraordinary” remedies).50 This jurisdiction was
well-entrenched by Montesquieu’s time. The basic function of the courts in
this regard was to ensure that administrators acted “legally.” Some of the
relevant law they enforced came from Parliament, but a significant amount
was judicially-made. These facts help to explain why William Blackstone,
writing not long after Montesquieu, treated independence of the judiciary as
the most important element of separation of powers in the English system.51
Despite their change of status as a result of the Revolution, the common law
courts were still important participants in central, as well as local,
government, both as law-makers and controllers of the administration.
Thirdly, Montesquieu paid very little attention to the electoral system.
He acknowledged that “in large states,” the individual self-government
essential to liberty had to be representative.52 But England, at this time, was
certainly not a democracy in the modern sense. Members of the House of
was made in a different way than ‘ordinary’ law. To this day, England lacks a constitution in this sense. The
sources of English constitutional law are the same as the sources of English tort law, for instance. See infra
Part VII.
47
This had been recognised in some way or another since at least the fifteenth century.
48
Meaning, “not delegated.”
49
See S.B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137 (3d ed. 1965) (explaining that before
the Conquest, and for some time after, the most important local official was the sheriff. However, in order to
exert more control over local administration, Edward III (who reigned from 1327 to 1377) instituted the
office of Justice of the Peace (JP). Under the Tudors in the sixteenth century, JPs “became the chief pillars
of local government.”).
50
See generally EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1963).
51
J.W.F ALLISON, THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND EUROPEAN
EFFECTS 78–83 (Cambridge, 2007).
52
MONTESQUIEU 1989 supra note 33, at 159.
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Commons were elected by a very small proportion of the population qualified
to vote by virtue of high status or wealth. In modern, populist terms, the
typical member of Parliament belonged to the social elite. “Representation”
was a paternalistic, not an egalitarian, concept. The electoral system was
corrupt. Both the monarch, and the nobility (who collectively constituted the
upper house of Parliament, the House of Lords), were able to buy votes and,
in that way, get their cronies into the House of Commons.53 This inevitably
affected the way the legislative power—shared between the monarch, the
nobility, and the elected representatives of “the people”—was exercised.
Electoral corruption (“patronage”) provided the monarch and the aristocracy
with a tool that could be used to influence, if not control, the behaviour of the
House of Commons.
C.

Montesquieu and the Separation of Powers in America

Montesquieu’s analysis influenced the drafting of the Constitution of
the emergent United States of America. As is well known, in The Federalist
Papers, James Madison expressed the opinion that “[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”54 Despite the fact that
the Founders deliberately set out to reject many aspects of their English
constitutional heritage, the constitutional design of the U.S. system of
government bears more than a passing resemblance to the English system as
portrayed by Montesquieu. The U.S. Presidency, like the eighteenth-century
English monarchy, and unlike the current U.K. executive, is constituted by a
single person.55 Members of the two Houses of Congress respectively were to
be chosen by different methods and electorates, and these, in turn, differed
from the method and electorate by which the President was chosen.56 Senior
government officials were to be dependent on the President, not Congress.
53

LOVELL, supra note 23, at 426–32.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
55
In the United Kingdom today, the “government” consists of about 100 (elected) members of
Parliament, some 25 of whom constitute the Cabinet.
56
In Montesquieu’s England, the monarch was chosen by the Houses of Parliament; membership of
the House of Lords was initially by royal appointment and, thereafter, heredity; and membership of the House
of Commons depended on election under a very limited franchise. In the United States, the President was to
be chosen indirectly by the whole nation, Senators by State governments, and Members of Congress by a
section of the population. By the mid-eighteenth century, the franchise was significantly wider in America
than in Britain, making the electoral system (in theory, at least) less manipulatable. In the U.S. system, the
English monarch, aristocracy and common people become, respectively, the nation, the states, and individual
citizens qualified to vote. The development of political parties has transformed both schemes, see infra Part
V.
54
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The main function of the President would be to run the country in accordance
with the laws made by Congress (subject only to a qualified presidential veto
designed primarily to afford the president self-protection against
Congressional attack). As in England, the independence of the judiciary in
deciding individual cases was to be protected and promoted by security of
tenure and salary.
We can summarize so far in this way: according to Montesquieu and
the American Founders, liberty-protecting-and-enhancing government
consisted of three “branches”: a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary; each
branch exercised a characteristic function: legislative, executive, and judicial,
respectively. By reason of its representative element and its legislative power,
the legislature was the most important branch. The executive’s prime role was
to run the administration in accordance with the legislature’s will as expressed
in statutes. The judiciary’s role was to enforce the sovereign’s will (whether
that of the people expressed in the Constitution, or of Congress expressed in
statutes) in individual cases.
The U.S. Constitution illustrates several significant aspects of
Montesquieu’s analysis and ideas. First, it appears to give little creative power
to the executive or the judiciary and the lion’s share to the legislature. The
President’s signature role is “to take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”57 The primary function of the Supreme Court is to enforce the will
of the sovereign as expressed in the Constitution, Congressional statutes, and
treaties. The legislature is constructed as the most powerful and, hence, in the
view of the Founders, the most dangerous branch.58 Unlike the English
Parliament at the time (and today), it had exclusive power to initiate
legislation, including financial legislation, and to organise the bureaucracy.
From a modern perspective, the Constitution says very little about the nature,
functions, powers, and control of the executive. This arguably reflects the fact
that the monarchy had been cut down to size in 1688. In Federalist 69,
Alexander Hamilton went to considerable lengths to reassure Americans that
the U.S. presidency would be even weaker than the English monarchy. 59 The
less said in the Constitution about the executive, the better!

57
58
59

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Second, apart from specifying the role of popular voting in choosing
various public officials, the Constitution says very little about elections. This
is not surprising. In Montesquieu’s eyes, England was not a democracy but
something like an aristocratic republic. Even though the franchise in America
at this time was wider than that in England,60 the Founders intended to
establish a republic, not a democracy.61 Only the House of Representatives
was to be directly elected by the people. Popular election of other public
officials would come only later. As an entity, “the People” might be sovereign,
but only a minority of them had a vote.
Third, apparently like Montesquieu, the Founders thought of courts as
law-enforcers, not law-makers. As such, the judiciary was “the least
dangerous” branch.”62 The prime function given to the U.S. Supreme Court
by the Constitution is not to make law,63 or even to resolve disputes,64 but to
enforce the Constitution, and statutes and treaties made under it. 65 The
Constitution gives the Supreme Court very little jurisdiction to make law
independently of applying, enforcing, and interpreting the Constitution, and
Congressional statutes and treaties made in accordance with the
Constitution.66 This does not mean, of course, that federal courts do not play
a creative role in interpreting and applying these various types of law. What
it does mean, however, is that unlike English courts (for instance), U.S. federal
courts have no autonomous, inherent power to make law under their own
steam, as it were. Rather, it is the state courts that have inherited the inherent
power of the English courts to make common law.67

60

In effect giving the vote to all white, male, free persons who owned property or paid taxes.
“Madison and his Federalist allies in the 1780s regarded the Constitution as a republican effort to
slow a democratic tide”: Mark Tushnet, et.al., Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 3.
62
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
63
That is the characteristic job of Congress.
64
Most of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is appellate.
65
Note that the Supremacy Clause does not mention court decisions as a source of law. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
66
CANE, supra note 6, at 62–64. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“[I]n the federal courts . .
. with a qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there is no such thing as common law.”).
67
Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015). In
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), the Supreme Court decided that it, too, had a share in this power, but
changed its mind in 1938, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Ernest A. Young, Erie As
a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266857.
61
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In certain respects, however, the U.S. Constitution represents a radical
departure from Montesquieu’s world-view. First, it embodies a very different
concept of a constitution and of constitutional law than underpins The Spirit
of the Laws. In Montesquieu’s account, the word “constitution” of a polity
referred to the “nature,” or “shape” or “structure” or “make-up” of relations
between the governors and the governed in that polity. For him, the “laws of
the constitution” would have been the aspects of those relations that were
“necessary . . . deriving from the nature of things.”68 He had no concept of a
“constitution” as a document that codified (i.e., exhaustively stated) relations
between governors and governed in positive legal form. Moreover,
Montesquieu located sovereignty within the government machine whereas
American republicanism fixed it outside government in “the People.” The
Constitution and its Amendments (including the Bill of Rights) were
understood to be the embodiment and ultimate expression of the sovereignty
of the People. These were probably the most fundamental, American
departures from English constitutionalism.69 In them, we find the seeds of the
modern concept of constitutional law.
Secondly, the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, ratified in
1791, in time came to be thought of as a free-standing Bill of Rights. These
rights were not initially conceived of as protections for individual interests but
rather as limitations on federal legislative power.70 The justiciability of
constitutional rights was soon established71 and came to be referred to as
“judicial review of legislation” or “constitutional judicial review.” In the
British system at this time, the only “court” with the power to review
legislation for incompatibility with law was the Privy Council, and its power
was limited to legislation made by colonial legislatures which, by definition,
were not sovereign.72
By this point, all the elements of what Stephen Gardbaum, 150 years
on, called “the post-[World War Two] paradigm” of constitutional law, were
in place: a codified, written constitution that establishes “the ground rules of
68

MONTESQUIEU 1989, supra note 33, at 3.
Today, very few countries lack a codified, written Constitution. Remaining examples are the U.K.,
New Zealand, and Canada. Israel is in a category by itself. Iddo Porat, The Platonic Conception of the Israeli
Constitution, in THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 268–97 (Rosalind Dixon &
Adrienne Stone eds., 2018).
70
Peter Cane, Two Conceptions of Constitutional Rights, 8 INSIGHTS 2–8 (2015),
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ias/insights/Cane.pdf.
71
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
72
F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 320, 462–64 (1st ed. 1961).
69
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government” and protects certain rights, and which “sits at the apex of its legal
system . . . [as] the supreme law of the land . . . authoritatively interpreted and
applied by a high court with power to set aside conflicting non-constitutional
law and legal acts.”73 Gardbaum recognised that there were “outliers” that did
not fit the paradigm in one respect or another. Most notably for our purposes,
the United Kingdom has no written, codified constitution. In fact, Gardbaum
went on to argue that the paradigm may be dissolving before our eyes as
scholars realise how many gaps there are in codified constitutions, especially
those like the U.S. Constitution that are brief and now very old, and how much
constitutional law, even in systems with written constitutions, is not to be
found in the document itself.74 Terms such as “constitutional silence”75 and
“the invisible constitution”76 are increasingly commonplace.
Be that as it may, the effect of the passage of time on the nature of
written constitutions is not the topic here. Rather, our concern is with its
impact on the structure and operation of the main institutions of government.
Although those institutions, both in England and the United States today, may
be superficially similar to their mid-eighteenth-century predecessors, they and
the ways they interact have changed dramatically. There is a wide gap
between contemporary political practice and the late-eighteenth century
model of constitutionalism and constitutional law, based on a codified
Constitution which has not been changed in its fundamentals since 1789.
Six engines of change deserve some discussion: first, the development
of mass electoral democracy and universal suffrage, and the use of popular
election as the preferred way of choosing a significant proportion of public
officials; secondly, the apparently irreversible growth of the maxi, supersized, administrative state in all its various manifestations; thirdly, the spread
of written constitutionalism; fourthly, rapid, transitional, non-organic nationbuilding; fifthly, the post-WWII rights revolution; and sixthly, what I shall
call (for want of a better term) “globalisation,” the meaning of which will be
explained later.

73

Stephen Gardbaum, The Place of Constitutional Law in the Legal System, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
74
Id. at 172–73.
75
Richard Albert & David Kenny, The Challenges of Constitutional Silence: Doctrine, Theory, and
Applications, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 880, 880–81 (2018).
76
See generally Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone, The Invisible Constitution in Comparative
Perspective, in THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 69.
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FIRST ENGINE OF CHANGE: DEMOCRACY
A.

Montesquieu and the American Founders

Dealing first with democracy, Montesquieu explicitly acknowledged
(as already noted) that “in large states,” the individual self-government
essential to liberty had to be representative.77 Such representatives, he
thought, should be chosen by “all citizens . . . of each principal town . . . except
those whose estate is so humble that they are deemed to have no will of their
own.”78 However, Montesquieu certainly did not think of England as a
democracy. He divided governmental regimes79 into four types:
republicanism, monarchy, despotism, and what we might, for convenience,
call “liberalism.”80 He identified two forms of republicanism: aristocracy and
democracy. In his view, each variety of government was based on a
“principle” or, as we might say, a “value”: republicanism on virtue, monarchy
on honour, despotism on fear, and liberalism on “liberty.”81 Monarchy was
government by one, aristocracy government by few, and democracy
government by many (all or part of “the people”).
Montesquieu understood despotism not in terms of the number of
governors, but by drawing a contrast between it and “moderate” government.
Any form of government, including democratic republicanism, might be
despotic if its motor was fear. Conversely, he seems to have believed that any
form of government could be moderate. He classified liberalism as moderate
even though, in terms of his classification, he seems to have thought of
England as a monarchy or an aristocratic republic, not a democracy. For him,
liberty did not imply democracy but was, rather, the state of “having the power
to do what one should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what
one should not want to do . . . . Liberty is the right to do everything the laws
permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer have
liberty because the others would likewise have the same power”: “freedom
under law” we might say.82 As we have seen, for Montesquieu, liberal
government was characterised by division and sharing of power
“functionally” among a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary, and of
legislative power socio-politically among the one, the few, and the many.
77
78
79
80
81
82

MONTESQUIEU 1989, supra 33, at 159.
Id. at 159–60.
Which he referred to as “varieties of relations between governors and governed.”
Although Montesquieu did not attach the name “liberalism” to this type of regime.
MONTESQUIEU 1989, supra note 33, at Book 3.
Id. at 155.
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Under liberalism, unlike despotism, citizens would not live in a state of fear
of each other or the governors. In Montesquieu’s mind, however, none of this
implied or required popular democracy, which he did not envisage.
Nor did the American Founders think that democracy was necessary (or
sufficient) for the protection of liberty. Indeed, it was James Madison’s
opinion that in a republic, an elected legislature presented the greatest risk of
“overruling” the power of the other branches “by everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”83 In
Federalist 49 and Federalist 50, Madison rejected the idea that “occasional”
or even “periodical” “appeals to the people” would be suitable mechanisms
for restraining invasion by the legislature of the provinces of the executive
and judiciary—in other words, for “enforcing” the limits imposed by the
Constitution on legislative power.84 In the famous Federalist 51, Madison
argued that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”85 by providing
each department of government with means of “self-defence.” Because—
Madison asserts—the legislature must predominate in a republican system of
government, its tendency to tyrannical behaviour must be countered by
dividing it into two houses86 and “render[ing] them, by different modes of
election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other
as the nature of their common functions . . . will admit”;87 and by giving the
executive a qualified veto over legislation.
B.

Mass Enfranchisement

Since 1789, gradual enfranchisement culminating (in the twentieth
century) in universal adult suffrage, and extension of popular election as the
preferred mode of selecting public officials, have fundamentally affected the
way governments at all levels operate. In nineteenth-century England, for
instance, it underpinned the “democratisation” of local government and the
development of the principle that the government was responsible to the
elected Parliament, not to the (hereditary) monarch (“responsible
government”). It also led to the creation of extra-Parliamentary political
parties as machines for mobilising the electorate as opposed to mechanisms
83

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Madison cites experience in Virginia and Pennsylvania
to support this opinion).
84
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 49, 50 (James Madison).
85
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
86
The House of Representatives and the Senate.
87
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

548

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 2

for organising the internal operations of Parliament. In the early years of the
move to responsible government, before the advent of political parties,
Parliament was able to flex its muscles and dismiss unpopular governments.88
However, a system of responsible government coupled with strong political
parties, and strong party discipline in the legislature, very greatly reduces the
power of the legislature to “overrule” the executive. The history of legislatures
in parliamentary systems of government in the twentieth century has been one
of gradually declining power;89 the stronger the discipline imposed on
legislators by their parties, the less effective the control Parliament can exert
over the executive. For Montesquieu, the English legislature was the centre of
gravity of the governmental system, the sun around which the executive and
the judiciary revolved. Now, it would be more accurate, and only slightly
hyperbolic, to say that Parliament is a satellite of the government.
In the United States, too, the development of extra-Congressional
political parties soon after the Founding brought about fundamental
transformations of the make-up and functioning of governmental institutions,
and major re-adjustments of relationships between them.90 For instance,
because the president was “the only political figure chosen, albeit indirectly,
by the nation’s entire electorate,” the president could claim a unique
“democratic mandate” and become the pivot around which the national
political-party system revolved.91 Again, in the Founder’s scheme, the three
elements of the legislature were to be chosen in different ways. The
development of political parties created the possibility that control of the
various elements might be divided between the parties. This was not too great
a problem so long as the political parties were not strongly ideological.
However, there is general agreement that, in the latter part of the twentieth
century, the two main parties have become increasingly ideologically
polarised,92 and (perhaps partly as a result) divided government has become
more common. Divided government and party polarisation aggravate the
88
A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION 135–36 (1964) (“Between 1832 and 1867 no fewer than ten governments were brought to an
end by adverse votes in the Commons . . . in these years not a single government lasted the entire life of a
Parliament . . .”).
89
Except, perhaps, in the Nordic systems. See HELLE KRUNKE & BJÖRG THORARENSEN, THE NORDIC
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL STUDY (2018).
90
For an early, perceptive comparative discussion, see W.F. Willoughby, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MODERN STATES 227–67 (1919).
91
MARK TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 78 (2d ed. 2015).
92
See, e.g., Marc J. Hetherington, Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 413 (2009); Russell Muirhead & Nancy L. Rosenblum, The Uneasy Place of Parties in the
Constitutional Order’, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 217.
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inherent tendency in the system towards legislative inertia and gridlock, and
this benefits the presidency which, over the past 200 years, has been given by
Congress, and has taken for itself, significant powers of unilateral action. As
a result, the president may be able to act without the cooperation of Congress,
but Congress cannot act without the acquiescence of the president.
C.

Elections and Voting Systems

Voting systems are critical to the practice of politics in democracies.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that they define much of what democracy
means in any particular system.93 In parliamentary systems, the dynamics of
politics are greatly influenced by the choice between proportional and firstpast-the-post voting arrangements. It is (for instance) harder for small
(populist) political parties to gain a foothold in the legislature and the
executive in first-past-the-post systems, such as that of the United Kingdom,
than in systems of proportional voting, where it is easier for small parties to
win seats and thus have a chance of participating in a coalition government.94
In the United States, the primary system and the electoral college are
significant features of presidential elections, as is the location of control of
electoral boundaries.95 The choices between centralised and diffused, and
politicised and non-politicised, control of electoral boundaries have important
implications for populist electoral strategies. The choice between compulsory
voting96 and free voting is also important. For instance, much may depend on
the extent to which voting is viewed as a duty and a privilege, on the one hand,
or as an invasion of autonomy and a waste of time on the other; and on whether
it is seen as a thing to be encouraged or something that may be suppressed.
Although election law and the legal framework of popular democracy
are foundational to the operation of democratic systems of government, in
many democracies the law of elections and democracy is almost entirely
statutory, not constitutional. Electoral law tends to be a very minor scholarly
speciality outside the framework of constitutional law and theory. And yet the
law of elections and democracy is central to understanding and regulating

I doubt the proposition that “many theories about how democratic governments function fit all
democracies.” BARBARA GEDDES, ET. AL, HOW DICTATORSHIPS WORK: POWER, PERSONALIZATION, AND
COLLAPSE 3 (2018).
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See generally supra note 3.
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See TUSHNET, supra note 91, at 49–62.
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executive primacy and populism.97 Democracy has been a major factor in the
strengthening of executives vis-à-vis legislatures in the past century.
Manipulating and influencing the exercise of popular electoral power is a
basic populist tactic in democratic systems. 98 As a form of public power,
electoral power, as it operates in modern democracies, was invisible to
Montesquieu and the American Founders and plays only a marginal role in
the constitutional theory to which their ideas gave substance. The existence
and importance of electoral power drives a wedge between classic
constitutional law and theory and contemporary democracy (and its ills, of
which populism is considered to be one).
D.

Democracy and Liberty

The main concern of Montesquieu and the American Founders was how
to design government in such a way as to secure individual liberty. They
agreed that the separation of powers was an important part of the answer. The
involvement of citizens in the selection of governors or a fortiori in
government itself—electoral and participatory democracy, in modern terms—
was not high on their agenda. Now, by contrast, democracy is the name of the
game. Executive primacy and populism are widely viewed as pathologies of
representative democracy that thrive when significant portions of the
population feel neglected by their elected representatives.99 Many understand
liberty to be a by-product of democracy in much the same way as eighteenthcentury theorists considered that it would follow from separation of powers.100
However, rather than adopting democracy as a principle of constitutional
design in the way that Montesquieu and the American Founders adopted
separation of powers, “moderns” treat democracy, like “the ancients” treated
97

On the role of elections in dictatorships, see GEDDES, ET AL., supra note 93, at 129–50; and STEVEN
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5–8, 12–13 (2010).
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Torre ed., 2014); Kenneth M. Roberts, Populism and Political Parties, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note
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THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 517–32 (Carol Lancaster & Nicolas van de Walle eds., 2018).
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liberty, as the purpose of constitutionalism and constitutional design, not a
means to an end. One result of doing this is that modern theorists tend to
ignore the gap between modern political practice and the constitutional
technology inherited from the eighteenth century.
To give one example, to which we shall return in Part VIII below,
Montesquieu considered that in England, the judicial function was (as it
should be) “invisible and null.”101 It was important for him that judges be
“independent” of politicians, not because that would increase their power but
precisely in order to ensure that all they did was to enforce the letter of the
politicians’ law without being able to alter it at the point of application.
Similarly, the American Founders conceived of the judicial function as being
to enforce law, not to make it. Now, many look to courts to protect individual
human rights against political abuse and, even, to promote democracy. 102 At
the same time, many feel distinctly uncomfortable with casting judges in such
active roles because they are so different from the passive roles allocated to
the judiciary in classical constitutional law and theory. Inherited theory does
not fit modern practices and expectations. At one and the same time, party
democracy has strengthened executives vis-à-vis legislatures and undermined
courts as active controllers of administrative power.
VI.

SECOND ENGINE OF CHANGE: THE MAXI-STATE

The development of democratic practices and norms in circumstances
of rapid, technological innovation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
produced social and political pressures that catalysed a second engine of
change: the growth-and-growth of the maxi, super-sized, “administrative
state.” Popular need and demand, plus the exigencies of two World Wars and
the Great Depression, allowed and encouraged greater and greater
government participation in, and regulation of, the social and economic life of
civil society. This led to massive growth in the size and functions of the
bureaucracy, and the emergence of an important distinction between the
elected and appointed elements of “the executive” (or, in other words,
between the (elected) executive and the (appointed) bureaucracy).
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MONTESQUIEU 1989, supra 33, at 158.
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This second engine of change is relevant, in particular, to understanding
the dichotomy, within public law theory and thought, between constitutional
law and administrative law.
A.

Administration and Administrative Law

The idea of separate categories of administrative power and
administrative law developed in Continental Europe before they appeared in
the Anglo-American world. In 1903, Frank Goodnow wrote that he was
effectively forced to study administrative law comparatively because of “the
complete lack of any work in the English language on administrative law as a
whole” contrasted with the “the richness of the literature of foreign
administrative law.”103 This was not, of course, because there was no
administrative law in the Anglosphere at the time. We have seen, for instance,
that English courts had been reviewing local administrative action since the
early-seventeenth century; and Jerry Mashaw has magisterially traced the
development of U.S. administrative law in the nineteenth century.104 Rather,
it may be explained by an important difference of approach to control of
administrative power in Europe compared with England and the United States.
Put simplistically, the European (or, more specifically, German) rechtsstaat
model of administrative law has two main elements: use of detailed rules to
regulate administrative conduct in advance (“prospectively”), and a distinct
set of administrative courts to settle disputes (“retrospectively”) between
citizen and government.105 By contrast, the Anglo-American model relies less
on prospective regulation of administrative conduct and more on retrospective
control through the handling of disputes between citizen and government by
the same courts that deal with disputes amongst citizens.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-American model was
theorised by Albert Venn Dicey in his concept of “the rule of law,” under
which the “ordinary” courts play the central role in ensuring that
administrative activity is conducted according to law.106 Significantly, Dicey
constructed the rule of law as part of an account of constitutional law, not
103
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administrative law. Dicey understood “administrative law” in European
rechtsstaat (not the English rule-of-law) terms.107 Thus interpreted, he
strongly opposed its introduction to England on the ground that it ran counter
to the ideal of equality of governors and the governed before a single law,
applicable to both without discrimination or difference, and applied and
enforced by ordinary (not special administrative) courts. He wanted to prevent
administrative law in the rechtsstaat mould crossing the English Channel. At
the same time, in the face of democracy-induced weakness of Parliament to
resist and regulate the executive, he promoted the judiciary to the very centre
of his theory of limited government. Goodnow barely mentions Dicey and
sidesteps debate about the two models of administrative law by devoting
relatively few pages of his book to control of administrative power and
focusing, instead, on the structure organisation and empowerment of the
administration.108
In England, a set of what were, in effect, administrative courts (called
“tribunals”), had begun to develop in the mid-nineteenth century alongside
ordinary courts.109 Tribunals were not understood to be part of the judiciary
but, rather, an offshoot of the executive. Dicey ignored them. But, by the early
twentieth century, the terms of the debate had shifted well beyond Dicey. The
question was no longer whether there should be distinct administrative courts
but whether, and the extent to which, decisions of such courts should be
subject to judicial review by the ordinary courts. This debate about the degree
of judicial control continues to the present day.110
In the United States, similarly, by the time of the New Deal, debates
were revolving not so much around the relative benefits of, and the
relationship between, administrative adjudication and adjudication by
ordinary courts but around how much control the ordinary courts should
More particularly, he equated “administrative law” with the French droit administrative, which rests
on a categorical distinction between public law and private law and an institutional distinction between
“ordinary” and “administrative” courts. Id.
108
Cf. TOM GINSBURG, Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian
Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 59 (2008) (“In the
Western legal tradition, administrative law concerns the rules for controlling government action”). There is
an important distinction between “administrative law” in the sense of law made by the administration and in
the sense of law about the administration. As used in this article, “administrative law” refers to the latter. Of
course, law about the administration may be made by the administration, but that is not its only–or even,
perhaps, its most important source.
109
See generally CHANTAL STEBBINGS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRIBUNALS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND (2006); WILLAM A. ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1951).
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exercise over administrative decision-making through judicial review. ProDiceyan American lawyers, such as John Dickinson111 and Roscoe Pound,112
argued for close judicial control whereas keen New Dealers, such as Felix
Frankfurter,113 favoured extensive administrative discretion and light judicial
review. Frankfurter had a long-running debate with a German emigré legal
scholar, Ernst Freund, about the merits of the rechsstaat model of
administrative law, which Freund championed and to which the likes of
Dickinson and Pound were deeply opposed for essentially the same reasons
as Dicey.114 For New Dealers like Frankfurter, however, the main concern was
the intensity of control of administration, not the identity of the controller. A
compromise over the scope and intensity of judicial review was embodied in
the Administrative Procedure Act 1946. After WWII, administrative courts
(staffed by Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and Administrative Judges
(AJs)) began to appear in areas of high-volume decision-making such as social
security and immigration, operating under a presumption that their decisions
were subject to judicial review in the ordinary courts.115 The appearance of
these bodies was associated with enormous growth in administrative rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s designed, in part, to regulate exercise of
administrative power. In U.S. law today, judicial control of administrative
rule-making is, if anything, more significant than judicial review of
administrative adjudication.116
At all events, in the Anglo-American axis, it seems clear that as a
separate legal category, administrative law is a product of increasing
involvement of government in social and economic life and consequent
growth in the bureaucracy, starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Dicey’s constitutional, ordinary-court-focused, rule-of-law account of judicial
control of administrative power was gradually replaced by a new
administrative model. In this new model, judicial review by ordinary courts
was retained as the ultimate guarantor of administrative legality. At the same
time, space was created for elements of the European rechtsstaat model in the
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form of administrative adjudication and (in the United States, anyway) much
greater use of rules to regulate administrative activity prospectively.
For present purposes, the main point of these stories concerns the
internal structure of public law. Classic, eighteenth-century, inherited
constitutional theory is much concerned with executive dominance but finds
the key to control of the executive in its relationship with the legislature: the
balance of power in the system should favour the legislature at the expense of
the executive. In this picture, courts are more-or-less irrelevant to controlling
the executive. Perhaps the first observer of the English system to give
significant emphasis to judicial control of executive action was the German
scholar, Rudolph Gneist, who wrote about a century after Montesquieu in a
period when the concept of administrative law was already established on the
Continent.117 Later, Dicey’s aversion to the French version of the Continental
model of administrative law played (I would argue) an important role in
divorcing administrative law from constitutional law in the Anglo-American
mind. One result has been to set up a contrast between constitutional and
administrative strands of public law. Instead of being integrated with the
constitutional strand to produce holistic public law and theory, administrative
law and theory, and constitutional law and theory, run in more-or-less parallel
streams. In my judgment, the constitutional strand of public law is understood
to be concerned with big “architectural” issues of governmental design and
with large concepts such as sovereignty, democracy, rule of law, and rights.
By contrast, the administrative strand deals with the sub-constitutional,
everyday affairs of government and utilizes “small,” “engineering” concepts
such as legality, rationality, and procedural fairness. Administrative law is
concerned very largely with the relationship between judicial power and
executive/administrative
power;
the
relationship
between
executive/administrative power and legislative power is marginal to the
preoccupations of many administrative lawyers.
Contemporary executive primacy and populism are both products of the
administrative state (amongst other things). As such, they fall between the two
stools of public law. They raise important issues of institutional design that
classic constitutionalism and constitutional theory do not adequately address
because of their relative neglect of executive/administrative power. On the
other hand, because of their traditional sub-constitutional status,
administrative law and theory lack the architectural concepts and imaginative
RUDOLPH GNEIST, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 360, 360 –72 (2d ed. 1889). Gneist
started studying the English system in the 1850s.
117
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frameworks for understanding these phenomena. One reaction to this situation
is to constitutionalise administrative law. In Section XI.B below we will
consider whether such moves address the issues that executive primacy and
populism present.
B.

Separation of Powers in the Maxi-State

Another reason why classical constitutional theory does not have much
to say about phenomena such as executive primacy and populism is its
weddedness to tripartite separation of powers. We have already discussed the
importance of a “fourth” power, electoral power, in understanding modern
government. But there is more to be said.
1.

Bureaucratic Power

Perhaps the most obvious institutional characteristic of the
administrative state is the size of the bureaucracy—the appointed element of
the executive branch—relative to the size of the elected element, to which the
word “executive” is traditionally applied and will be applied in this context.
The relationship between the bureaucracy and the executive has changed
dramatically since the mid-eighteenth century.118 Then, national governments
were mainly concerned with internal peace and order and external security.
Ministers of state had very small staffs, the members of which were typically
appointed on the basis of personal or political patronage rather than merit or
capacity. The relationship between the minister and their staff was typically
that of master and servant rather than principal and agent or delegator and
delegate. As national governments assumed more and more functions in the
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not only the number of
ministers and departments of state increased, but also the size of their
bureaucratic staffs. Merit replaced political patronage as the basis for
appointment to the bureaucracy, which, as a result, became increasingly
professionalised and, because of its size, hierarchically organised.119
Inevitably, the relationship between ministers and most members of their
staffs became more remote.
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As a result of these developments, the bureaucracy started to look like
a distinct governmental institution in its own right. This was particularly the
case in the United States where a Congressional policy of limiting presidential
control over the bureaucracy led to the creation of so-called “independent
agencies” to perform certain governmental functions.120 In turn, this policy of
limiting presidential control over the bureaucracy generated a distinction
between politics and administration, presidential control being identified with
politics, and administration with the bureaucracy.121 Administration came to
be understood as a technical exercise of expertise in matching non-political
means to political ends. In this understanding, the President and Congress
were responsible for defining (politically determined) ends and the
bureaucracy for developing the most appropriate (non-politically devised)
means to those ends. This is one reason why the bureaucracy came to be
thought of as a “fourth branch of government” alongside the traditional three
branches, exercising a fourth public “bureaucratic” function in addition to the
already-recognised three. Despite these theoretical and practical
developments, constitutional law and theory continues to cling to its inherited,
tripartite analysis of the structure of government. Yet, control of the
relationship between executive and bureaucratic power is one of the keys to
understanding executive primacy and populism.
2.

Coercive Power

There is another type of power relevant to understanding executive
primacy and populism, namely coercive power.122 The typical repositories of
coercive power are the armed forces and, to a greater or lesser extent, the
police. Police power is particularly important for maintaining internal,
domestic “law and order” and social stability. Domestic coercive power was
invisible to Montesquieu, perhaps because he was writing before the advent
of governmental police forces. He does not mention the monarch’s
prerogative power to control the armed forces, probably because armed force
played no significant role in the day-to-day domestic life of the nation.

120

The Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887, was the first.
The locus classicus is Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197–222
(1887). For a general discussion see Tansu Demir, Politics and Administration: Three Schools, Three
Approaches, Three Suggestions, in 31 ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND PRAXIS 503, 503–32 (2009).
122
On the role of coercive power in dictatorships see GEDDES, ET AL., HOW DICTATORSHIPS WORK,
note 93, at 154–74.
121

558

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 2

The only issue about coercive power discussed (by Alexander
Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers (in Federalist 29) is whether there ought
to be a national militia or whether there should be only separate state
militias.123 Section 2[1] of Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes the
president the Commander-in-Chief of the armed services when they are acting
in “the actual Service of the United States,”124 which could include (according
to Article I, Section 8[14]) service “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions.”125 The assumption here seems to be that,
in terms of Montesqueiu’s tripartite functional classification, coercive power
is a form of executive power. This view seems implicit in the idea, expounded
in Federalist 78, that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch because it
lacks both the rule-making power of the legislature and the coercive power of
the executive.126
However, experience suggests a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between executive and coercive power. Armed forces may not be
under the effective control of the civilian executive; in that case, the civilian
executive may depend on the armed forces for its power, or the armed forces
may themselves take executive power into their own hands. Military
governments may or may not be populist, but the phenomenon certainly needs
to be taken into account in analysing and explaining executive power. The
topic generally receives little attention in its own right from public lawyers,
whether of the constitutional or the administrative variety.
3.

Vertical and Horizontal Separation of Powers

Montesquieu was concerned with what we might call “horizontal”
separation of powers between the main governmental organs in a polity. A
further complexity he did not have in mind is “vertical” separation of powers
between large, central governmental institutions and smaller, more localised
institutions. The U.S. Constitution was revolutionary partly because it created
a vertical division of power between the federal and the state governments
alongside the horizontal division of power at both of those levels of
government. Analyses of executive primacy and populism typically focus on
123
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the national level of government at the expense of sub-national levels, without
considering (for instance) whether and in what ways vertical separation of
power might affect the exercise of national executive power or how executive
primacy and populism might manifest themselves at sub-national levels.127
4.

Separation of Powers in Public Law

We might conclude that while Montesquieu’s tripartite analysis of
government was a work of genius in the eighteenth century, it now hinders
public lawyers from understanding and analysing modern government.
Instead of three powers, we have identified at least six: electoral power;
coercive power; executive power; bureaucratic power; legislative power; and
judicial power. Legislative power might be further subdivided into
Congressional and Parliamentary (primary) legislative power and secondary
(executive and administrative) legislative power; and judicial power might be
subdivided into judicial and administrative adjudicatory power. The
distinction between execution and administration128 also needs to be borne in
mind. Understanding and explaining complex governmental and political
phenomena such as executive primacy and populism (and modern governance
more generally) would be much enhanced by factoring into public-law theory,
where appropriate, all these types of power and their interactions. An
understanding of public law in which one element (administrative law and
theory) is associated with executive, administrative and bureaucratic power
and the other element (constitutional law and theory) more-or-less ignores it,
while also paying little or no attention to other relevant types of power and
focusing on legislatures and courts, creates a yawning gap between formal law
and theory and between formal law and political practice.
In short, public law theory and the structure of public law need
updating. This is not the place to develop a strategy for doing so. Elsewhere,
I have suggested that instead of analysing governmental and political
“systems” (or “regimes”) in Montesquieu’s terms, we could adopt a two-step
analysis.129 The first step would be concerned with how public legal power is
created, allocated, and distributed, and the second with how it is controlled. A
127
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useful way of thinking about the first step, I suggest, would be in terms of a
distinction between diffusion and concentration of power; a good way of
thinking about the second, and its relationship to the first, would be in terms
of a distinction between control by “checks and balances” and control by
“accountability” mechanisms. Having applied this approach to explaining
similarities and differences between the constitutional and administrative law
systems of England, the United States, and Australia, I believe that it has
significant potential as a way of understanding complex governmental and
political phenomena such as executive primacy and populism.130
The approach does not rest on specifying three (or any other particular
number) of governmental powers, and for this reason, it can accommodate
even radical changes in political and governmental structure and practice. For
instance, in the light of significant “privatisation” and “outsourcing” of the
performance of public functions over the last thirty years, it might stimulate
questions about whether or not it would be useful to think of practices of
“third-party government” in terms of a distinct type of power—“nongovernmental public power,” perhaps, or a “commercial,” or
“entrepreneurial” function.131 Similarly, it has been suggested that the
proliferation of independent, non-judicial agencies to control the executive,
which will be examined in Section XI.B below, is best understood in terms of
the concept of an “integrity branch” of government and an “integrity
function.”132

130
The articles by Gábor Atilla Tóth and Mauro Hiane de Moura have relevant things to say on this
topic. Gábor Attila Tóth, Breaking the Equilibrium: From Distrust of Representative Government to an
Authoritarian Executive, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2019); Mauro Hiane de Moura, “Never Before in the
History of This Country?”: The Rise of Presidential Power in the Lula da Silva and Rousseff Administrations
(2003-2016), 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 349 (2019).
131
Government entrepreneurial involvement in business enterprises was a significant feature of the
growth of the administrative state although more in the United Kingdom than the United states. Once a
business activity is transferred from the private to the public sector, it may be branded as “public” even if,
and when, it is returned to the private sector by privatisation or outsourcing. So viewed, the effect of return
to the private sector is to commit to non-governmental entities the performance of public functions. This
approach suggests a distinction to be drawn between public functions that may be committed to private
entities and those that may not. It is the former group that may be properly classified as entrepreneurial.
Constitutions and constitutional law have very little to say about the distinction between entrepreneurial and
non-entrepreneurial public power. See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006).
132
See, e.g., Wayne Martin, Whitmore Lecture, Forewarned and Four-Armed: Administrative Law
Values and a Fourth Arm of Government (Aug. 1, 2013); Chris Wheeler, Response to the 2013 Whitmore
Lecture by the Hon Wayne Martin AC, Chief Justice of Western Australia, 88 AUSTL. L. J. 740, 753 (2014);
AJ Brown, The Integrity Branch: A “System”, an “Industry”, or a Sensible Emerging Fourth Arm of
Government?, in MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AUSTRALIA (Matthew Groves ed., 2014).

April 2019

Executive Primacy, Populism, and Public Law

561

Under my approach, the starting point for analysis is the idea that every
political system strikes a balance between diffusion of power (to weaken
government) and concentration of power (to strengthen government).
Executive primacy and populism, for instance, may be understood as results
of changing the balance between diffusion and concentration of power in
favour of concentration. This way of looking at things breaks free from the
grip of the classical, tripartite analysis of public power. Unfortunately, space
does not permit an attempt to test such an approach in this context.
C.

Popular Hunger for Government

Executive primacy and populism are typically treated as problems to be
solved. However, it is, at least, worth observing that the development of the
administrative state is a result not merely of rulers’ love of power but also of
citizen’s demands and expectations that the state will step in to deal with
social problems that can be tackled only by coordinated action at the social
level. Classical constitutional law and theory were developed in the context
of struggles against monarchical executive power. The English Revolution
marked the triumph of a desire for “small, limited government.”
Montesquieu’s political agenda was to control the absolutist French
monarchy. The American Founders deliberately designed a federal
government that would be firmly limited and relatively weak. The main aim
of the Bill of Rights of 1791 was similarly to limit and weaken federal power
vis-à-vis the powers of the states. The Founders appreciated the value of
“energetic” administration,133 but only within confined boundaries.
In general, to different degrees in various cultures, attitudes towards
government and its appropriate functions have been transformed since the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Compared with two hundred years ago,
we now want and demand relatively large, unconstrained, energetic
government. This may not affect our attitude towards populism, but it will
surely influence the benchmark against which we measure executive
overreaching and make judgments about the optimum degree of executive
dominance. It is, we might say, largely a result of human wants, needs,
demands, and rising expectations that the balance of power has shifted away
from legislatures and towards executives and, to a much lesser extent, courts.
Executives are typically much more efficient than legislatures and courts in
doing many of the things that we want governments to do. This “modern”
attitude towards government is very different from that which animated the
133
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theoretical pioneers of the eighteenth century. Ironically, too, it is very
different from Dicey’s conservative liberalism that motivated his theory of the
constitution, which was so important in establishing a bifurcated public law.
VII. THIRD ENGINE OF CHANGE: WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The U.S. Constitution was amongst the first,134 purposefully-draftedand-adopted constitutional documents, at least in modern times. It provides
the basis for the modern paradigm of a constitution, which takes the form of
a written code embodying “higher law.” Constitutional law is “higher” in the
sense that, in case of conflict between constitutional law and nonconstitutional law, constitutional law prevails, and also in the respect that
constitutional law is more difficult to amend or repeal than non-constitutional
law. Relative “rigidity” is an identifying feature of written, codified
constitutionalism.135 The relative difficulty of repealing or amending higher
law may result in its enjoying greater longevity than non-constitutional law.
For instance, the U.S. Constitution has been amended only twenty-seven times
since 1789. More than a third of those amendments (the first ten: the Bill of
Rights) were ratified together in 1791. On the other hand, the U.S. constitution
is quite exceptional in its longevity.136
The constitution that Montesquieu observed and described was, of
course, uncodified, ordinary law. No one ever sat down to write “the English
Constitution,” and it does not constitute higher law. Like the rest of English
law, the Constitution is the product of the law-making activities of Parliament
and the courts, in particular, and can be changed in the same way as it is made.
We may hypothesise that the flexibility that characterizes such an uncodified,
organic constitution makes large-scale or radical constitutional change easier
in the medium-to-long term but more difficult in the short term, because
organic change typically takes longer than manufactured change. If this is
134
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correct, rigid constitutional arrangements may, ironically, provide more fertile
soil for executive primacy, authoritarianism, and populism than flexible
constitutional arrangements. Rapid change, within the formal rules of the
system and without explicit revolution, may be easier in a rigid constitutional
environment than under flexible constitutional arrangements.
This discussion alerts us to the existence of yet another relevant type of
public power: constituent power. For present purposes, constituent power may
be defined as the power to make, amend, and repeal constitutional law.137
Constituent power was invisible to Montesquieu because, in the systems, he
knew there was no relevant distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional law. More surprisingly, nor did the American Founders fully
appreciate the political significance of constituent power—perhaps because
they were engaged in the very process that would make it visible and
identifiable as a separate species of political power. However, in classic
constitutional theory, the last word—constituent power—must lie
somewhere. In a codified constitutional system, it lies with the constituent
assembly—the body to which the Constitution itself gives power to amend or
repeal the constitution. In the United Kingdom, non-codified, constitutional
system, the last word is formally given to Parliament. Courts have the final
power to interpret legislation, and in so doing, they may refuse to interpret a
statute inconsistently with some judge-made, common-law, “fundamental”
right or principle.138 However, Parliament has the power to override the
common law by statute. Even so, it cannot legislate in such a way as to create
“higher law” in the sense associated with codified constitutionalism because
no Parliament can “bind” its successors. Any statutory provision enacted by
an earlier Parliament can be repealed or amended by a later Parliament. In that
sense, but only in that sense, the United Kingdom lacks a constitution.
Constituent power is important for the understanding of executive
primacy and populism because, if the government can control the constituent
body or the institution in which constituent power resides, it can determine
the content of the constitution and, therefore, the extent of its own power. 139
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Populists and autocrats greatly value the capacity, which control of constituent
power can give them, to change the basic terms of politics.140 The process
underway in the United Kingdom at the time of writing, to give effect to the
so-called “Brexit referendum,” by which it was decided that the United
Kingdom should leave the European Union, provides an excellent and graphic
illustration. That decision was of the very greatest constitutional significance
and will lead to the deepest changes in U.K. constitutional law since the
decision to join the European Community (as it was then called) in the 1970s.
Normally, in order to remain in power, the U.K. executive must be able,
through the party system, to control the House of Commons. However, the
present situation is not normal, and there is serious doubt whether Theresa
May’s Conservative government will be able to secure a Parliamentary
majority for its constitutionally-transformative proposals. The harder it is for
the executive to capture the constitutional levers of power by amending
constitutional law, the less likely that radical forms of executive supremacy
and populism will be able to take root. Constitutional theorists think a lot
about original exercises of constituent power that produce a codified
constitution, and constitutional lawyers give considerable attention to the
occasional use of constituent power to amend codified constitutions. But, the
relevance of constituent power to the ongoing conduct of politics has received
less attention. Like electoral power, constituent power can often be found in
the populist toolbox.
The harder it is to change the constitution formally, the greater the need
to invent informal methods of keeping the Constitution “up to date” with
changing social, political, and economic conditions. One of the most
important informal methods is judicial interpretation.141 A good example is
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading out of (or in to) the U.S.
Constitution of abortion rights despite the fact that the Constitution says
nothing about abortion, or about a right to privacy on which abortion rights
were built.142 This helps to explain why authoritarian regimes (dominant
executives) typically put great weight on controlling the judiciary.
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VIII. FOURTH ENGINE OF CHANGE: TRANSITIONAL NATION-BUILDING
More nation-states were born in the twentieth century than in any other.
There were two major junctures: transition from war to peace and
decolonialisation. Both junctures were characterised by rapid manufacturing
of new states, the borders of which were based primarily on top-down,
geopolitical and strategic, rather than bottom-up, socio-political
considerations. In the rush to decolonise in the mid-twentieth century,
foundational documents modelled on classical, Montesquieuan constitutional
principles were more-or-less imposed on many newly-independent states.
It will be recalled that Montesquieu detected two axes of separation of
powers in the English system: socio-political, between the monarchy, the
aristocracy, and the common people; and institutional and functional, between
the monarch-in-Parliament, the (monarchical) executive and the judiciary.
The socio-political axis was effectively erased from the constitutional script
when Montesquieu’s analysis was adopted and adapted for use in America.143
Indeed, socio-political groups, notably Native Americans and African slaves,
were effectively excluded from the constitutional apparatus of the new polity.
Indigenous people were similarly denied recognition in the Australian
constitutional system. In Africa and Asia, ethnic and religious divisions that
had been more or less successfully suppressed during the colonial period came
to the surface after independence was granted under constitutional
arrangements that made no provision (such as vertical separation of powers)
for the management of such divisions. Inter-communal and inter-group strife
may plausibly be identified as one of the drivers of executive primacy and
populism.144
Another way of thinking about the relationship between the two
dimensions of separation of powers is in terms of the distinction between
liberty and equality. Liberty was the value that drove eighteenth-century
constitutional theorising and constitution making. For Montesquieu, both
dimensions of separation served this value. Today, liberty is harnessed with
equality, which is the underpinning value of democracy. Classic public law
143
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theory has little to say about equality, and classic democratic theory is
primarily concerned with political rather than material equality. Today, the
post-WWII fundamental human rights project within constitutionalism, and
especially its concern with “third-generation,” social and economic rights in
areas such as housing and education, may be understood as partly directed
towards rectifying this classic lack of attention to material equality. However,
not all aspects of inequality are dealt with at the constitutional level. More
recent constitutional bills of rights may include social and economic rights;
but while the U.S. Constitution has been found sufficiently capacious to
accommodate bans on active discrimination on grounds of race and religion,
for instance, it has been found much less welcoming to demands for positive
action to eliminate material inequality.145 To the extent that law is used to this
latter end, it is more likely to be sub-constitutional than constitutional—statute
or judge-made doctrines of administrative law. However, equality is as
marginal to the classic model of administrative law as it is to the classical
constitutional paradigm.
The orientation of classic public law theory to liberty and individualism
over equality and sociality helps to explain why it does not have much to
contribute to the study and understanding of pathologies of equality-focused
democracy, such as populism. All of the approaches to populism reviewed in
Part II of this article focus on conflict between groups defined in terms such
as “high” and “low” or “elite” and “common.” There is good evidence that
one of the roots of populism is actual and perceived inequality between social
groups—between the beneficiaries of capitalism and globalisation, and “those
left behind.”
IX.

FIFTH ENGINE OF CHANGE: THE POST-WWII RIGHTS REVOLUTION

Montesquieu’s political ideal was liberty, not rights. Liberty, for him,
was freedom to do whatever the law permits, but nothing that it forbids.146
One hundred and fifty years later, Dicey incorporated this ideal of legality into
his concept of the rule of law and justified his approach by claiming that the
best way to protect rights was to build them into the main body of the law, not
embody them in a separate bill of rights.147 At first, the American Founders,
145
146
147
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too, resisted the idea of a separate bill of rights. They eventually acquiesced
in order to buy off anti-Federalist opposition to the draft Constitution. The
prime purpose of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, ratified in
1791, was to limit the powers of the federal government to a greater extent
than did the main document itself.148 The rights were, first and foremost,
limitations on governmental power, not expressions of, or direct protections
for, the autonomy of individual citizens.149 In this way of thinking, individuals
are best protected by limiting the sphere and powers of government. This is
an understanding of rights fitted for an era of small government.
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was much greater
tolerance of and, indeed, desire for, large and robust government. The rise of
fascism and Nazism had also made people painfully aware of the weaknesses
of democracy as means to liberty, equality, security, and the risk that populism
would morph into dictatorship. Fundamental human rights were conceived as
a way of controlling strong, interventionist governments. Regional and global
human rights regimes proliferated, and courts—either dedicated constitutional
courts or all-purpose courts—became the preferred mode of protecting and
enforcing rights.150 In the United States, the Constitution was initially used in
the courts mostly to protect private property and contractual (“economic”)
rights against public regulation. This project was more-or-less abandoned in
the 1930s, and the Supreme Court moved on to using the Bill of Rights as a
tool for protecting the civil and political rights of social groups subjected to
discrimination, particularly on grounds of race.151 The next move was towards
protecting individual autonomy in areas such as sexual behaviour and
reproduction. At the frontier of the kingdom of rights are economic and social
rights—to adequate housing and education, for instance. In Samuel Moyn’s
words, rights have become “the last utopia,” the all-purpose means to
democracy, freedom, and even prosperity.152
The important point to make in the present context is that, because of
their association with the paradigm of classical constitutionalism, and because
148
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of the centrality of U.S. constitutionalism to that paradigm, rights “belong to”
constitutional law, not administrative law. Furthermore, because the classical
paradigm puts legislatures, not executives, at the centre of the governmental
universe, the prime function of rights in the classical way of thinking is to
control legislative power. Because the famous 1803 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Marbury v. Madison153 is universally recognised as the fons et
origo of judicial review of legislation—significantly also called
“constitutional review”—the gold standard of rights protection (in
constitutional theory, at least) is judicial. Rights are now linked with judicial
enforcement.154 Documentary bills of rights are directed, first and foremost,
against legislative power. This is not to say that constitutional rights are not
available against executive and administrative power, but this use is treated,
subliminally, at least, as subsidiary to the main thrust of the fundamental
human rights project. This may partly be explained by saying that the modern
obsession with rights has focused the attention of constitutional theorists on
the relationship between the judicial and legislative powers, much to the
neglect of other powers of government that are at least as important for
understanding how power is created, exercised, and controlled. When it comes
to executive primacy and populism, the relationship between the courts and
the legislature is only part of the story, and probably not the most significant
part.
The twentieth-century, judicially-enforced, human rights revolution
had the general effect (in theory, at least) of strengthening judiciaries against
legislatures and, to a lesser extent, executives. However, this happened against
a background in which the democratic principle of popular election to public
office had already undermined the acceptability and legitimacy, if not the
incidence and practices, of judicial creativity in making and interpreting law
and in controlling the other branches of government.
Ironically, universal acceptance of the desirability of judicial
independence, for which Montesquieu can be given most credit, has
aggravated the problem. Judicial independence was originally championed in
a period when the main pre-occupation of European political philosophers
153
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was how best to weaken monarchical executives and when democracy was
not highly valued.155 Making judges independent of the monarch was an
obvious move. However, with the advent of democracy, this very
independence from political control quickly provided reason to weaken
judiciaries as much as possible. Courts came to be seen as operating under a
democratic deficit and as plagued by a “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”156 By
strengthening judiciaries legally and politically vis-à-vis both legislatures and
executives, the post-WWII human rights movement aggravated the perceived
democratic deficit under which courts operate. A further aggravating factor is
the tendency to link human rights with democracy, which (as we observed
earlier) is now understood by many to be the whole point of a constitution.
This paradox makes courts vulnerable in contests with strong
executives, thus strengthening executives even more. A common populist
strategy is to weaken courts as much as possible. From this point of view, the
rights revolution is important not only to understanding the position and role
of courts, but also the desire of strong executives to disable them.
SIXTH ENGINE OF CHANGE: “GLOBALISATION”

X.

The scare quotes are used to indicate that the word and concept of
globalisation are given very broad meanings in this article. At the core of
classic constitutional theory sits the nation state, as this institution developed
between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. International law (a branch
of public law) started out as the “law of nations.” Peak nation-state (as it were)
occurred in the mid-late-twentieth century as a result of de-colonialisation and
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The first nation states were typically
created by amalgamation of smaller governmental units into a single larger
entity. The feasible size of a nation-state is related to, and limited by,
topography, available modes of transport and communication, and cultural
factors such as ethnic and religious diversity. The first technology invented to
evade the limitations of the nation-state as a unit of governance was
colonialism, which produced its own peculiar set of institutional and political
expedients to address the challenges of governance of diversity at a
distance.157 Next came federation, first invented in the United States. Treaty-
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based, supra-national confederation in the form of the European Union is the
latest major development along these lines.
The nation-state (federal or unitary) was firmly established as the basic
unit of governance by the middle of the nineteenth century. By then, however,
technological change was generating new possibilities and problems that
crossed the borders of nation-states. International organisations (such as the
International Postal Union) were created to facilitate productive cooperation
between nation-states.158 The main business of such organisations is
coordination and regulation of the activities of nation-states, other
international organisations and, increasingly, individuals. In the twentieth
century, advances in military technology that made “world war” possible
internationalised the search for peace. More recently, the end of the Cold War,
the information revolution, and heightened awareness of global problems such
as climate change, have brought about another step-change in the position of
the nation-state.
The first generation of international organisations were created by
treaties and agreements between nation-states. Now, there are international
organisations that do not owe their existence to the actions of nation-states,
and some have even entered into treaties with nation-states.159 This point is
critical to understanding the significance of such bodies in the context of this
article. Within nation-states, one of the functions of public law is to help to
reconcile unilateral use of official coercion, by the state against its citizens,
with the human aspiration for “self-government.” By contrast, as between
nation-states, the basic technique for legitimating coercion is consent. Treaties
are agreements between nation-states that regulate their interactions.
Organisations that are not established by treaties between nation-states cannot
rely on the consent of states to legitimise their regulatory activities. Where,
then, can they look?
Many international organisations are, effectively, mini-governments
without citizens or territory. In terms of classic constitutional theory, many of
them look like administrative organs lacking any or, at least, any mature,
legislature and any, or at least, any independent, courts. This helps to explain
158

See generally JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (3d ed.

2015).
159
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEA OF AUTONOMY (Richard Collins et al. eds., 1st ed.
2011); Fernando Lusa Bordin, THE ANALOGY BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(2019).

April 2019

Executive Primacy, Populism, and Public Law

571

the emergence of the concept of “global administrative law” as a conceptual
framework for thinking about allocation and control of the power of such
international organisations.160 Global administrative lawyers are concerned
with legitimising the exercise of administrative power by international
organisations by disciplining it in the name of established values found in
domestic administrative law, such as transparency, participation and reasongiving.161 Nevertheless, many international organisations perform legislative
and judicial as well as administrative functions, and this has encouraged some
scholars to think about and assess international organisations in terms of the
legitimating tropes of constitutional law, such as “democracy,” “rule of law,”
and “human rights.”162 Also, even though the European Union is a treatybased organisation, there is a lively debate about whether it is best understood
in administrative or constitutional terms.163
The basic point to draw from this brief discussion is that political
practices and the exercise of political power within nation-states (framed by
domestic, constitutional and administrative law) are increasingly affected by
exercises of power not only between nation-states (“internationally”) but also
“above” or “beyond” the nation-state (“supranationally”—a term applied to
the European Union, for instance), and in juristic spaces between nation-states
(“transnationally”). For instance, there is good reason to think that one of the
triggers of populism in some countries has been the increasing impact on the
traditional “sovereignty” of the nation-state164 of supranational and
For a recent assessment see generally Symposium, Global Administrative Law, 13 INT’L J. CONST.
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transnational centres, sites, and exercises of power. One scholarly reaction to
such developments is to create new legal categories such as European Union
Law or the Law of International Organizations, more-or-less distinct from
domestic public law. However, this tactic is unsatisfactory if we take seriously
the idea, with which this article started, that public law provides a holistic
normative framework for the exercise of political power.
Putting the point bluntly, classic constitutional and administrative law
and theory, being focused on the political practices of the nation-state, lack
the resources to understand and explain nation-state politics in a globalised
world. Under the classical model, foreign affairs beyond the borders of the
nation-state are, basically, a matter for the unilateral discretion of the
repository of domestic executive power. This approach was developed in and
suited for a world that no longer exists. Understanding why that is so requires
us to cast our gaze way beyond domestic politics.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the approach outlined earlier, that
organises public law around two parameters: concentration and diffusion of
power in the allocation of power, and control by checks and balances and
accountability—can also be fruitfully applied to supranational and
transnational sites of power.165 Space does not permit elaboration here.
XI.

CONSTITUTIONALISING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

One way of telling the historical story on which this paper is based is
as follows. In medieval England, all the main powers and functions of
government were concentrated in the hands of the sovereign monarch. In the
seventeenth century, the monarch was stripped of personal legislative power
and “sovereignty” passed to the legislature. At the same time, the monarch
was also stripped of personal adjudicative power, which was invested in
“independent” courts ultimately subject, and answerable, to the legislature.
The monarch was left with executive (and administrative) power. Upon the
foundation of the United States, sovereignty in that system was moved outside
government and located in the people. Legislative power was conferred on the
legislature, judicial power on the judiciary and executive (and administrative)
power on the president. However, as Frederick Port observed in 1929, by the
early twentieth century, much legislative power had shifted back from the
165
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legislature, and much adjudicatory power had shifted back from the courts, to
the monarch’s successor, the president in the U.S. system and the Prime
Minister and Cabinet in the English system.166 In other words, the diffusion of
power brought about by the English Revolution was significantly reversed,
resulting in greater concentration of power in the executive than had been the
case for several centuries. From this perspective, the period on which modern
constitutionalism was born was one of “constitutional exception”
characterised by relatively strong legislatures and relatively weak executives.
Diffusion of power—separation of institutions and functions—was the
preferred eighteenth-century mechanism for reducing and controlling the
power of the executive. The question raised by the re-concentration of power
in one institution was how to control that power by means other than
separation.
The invention of administrative law may be understood as providing an
answer to that question. Whereas institutional design (separation of
institutions and diffusion of power and functions) was the main constitutionallaw tool for limiting and controlling executive power, the main
administrative-law tool was retrospective “accountability” for the exercise of
executive and administrative power to institutions outside of, and in that
sense, independent of, the executive (the legislature and the courts), and to
institutions located within the executive branch (such as tribunals and ALJs)
protected by some form of Chinese Wall designed to give them a measure of
independence from those required to account to them. Typically,
administrative-law mechanisms (such as judicial review of administrative
action) lacked the constitutional status of institutional design principles. This
put administrative law at a relative juridical disadvantage because it lacked
the “higher law” status that was accorded to institutional design principles
under classical constitutional theory. Even in the English system where
constitutional law lacked this higher-law status, administrative law was
conceptualised as the younger and weaker sibling of constitutional law.
Post-WWII decolonialisation and the consequent creation of a large
number of new nation-states based on regimes varying all the way from liberal
democracy to party socialism,167 the processes of globalisation charted in the
previous section, and growing disenchantment with representative democracy
166

F.S. PORT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 327–28 (1929).
For more on the socialist constitutionalism see, e.g., Baogang He, Socialist Constitutionalism in
Contemporary China, in CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LIBERALISM 176 (Michael W. Dowdle, et al. eds.,
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have added urgency to the question of how best to control executive power
and its pathologies, such as populism. Two techniques have already been
discussed: fundamental human rights and global administrative law.
A.

Administrative Separation of Powers

Another suggested technique for controlling executive power is what
Jon Michaels has dubbed “a new, administrative separation of powers.”168 His
idea is to analyse the operation of U.S. administrative agencies in tripartite
terms, but instead of the three interacting elements being a legislature, an
executive, and a judiciary, they would be politically-appointed agency heads,
politically-insulated civil servants, and members of the public (through their
participation in agency proceedings). The role of the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary would be to preserve a “well-functioning, rivalrous
administrative separation of powers” under which the three elements of the
agency would check and balance each other.169
This is an ingenious suggestion in the context of the U.S. system of
governance. It recognises the importance of bureaucratic power and sets it in
formal competition with executive power. It also provides citizens with a
means, other than the ballot box, for exerting influence on government. To
this extent, it formally recognises popular participation and democracy as
forms of self-government in a way that the Founders certainly did not. It
reinterprets classic constitutional theory in the light of the growth of the
administrative state. However, it is not obvious that Michaels’ approach takes
us very far towards reinventing the classical model of public law to address
phenomena such as executive primacy, populism and globalisation. Its utility
is also limited by the way it constructs the relationship between the executive
and the bureaucracy, which is very different in the United Kingdom, for
instance, from what it is in the United States.170
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Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515–597
(2015); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and
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Constitutionalisation of Administrative Law

A fourth technique used to modify the traditional models in light of
changes in government and politics, in the past two centuries and more, is to
insert more provisions into a codified Constitution that deal with the executive
branch than are found in the U.S. Constitution, for instance. A good example
of such an approach is the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
In certain respects, the South African Constitution is a very
contemporary document. In addition to providing in separate chapters for a
national legislature, national executive, and judiciary, it deals at length with
each of the three levels of government: national, provincial, and local. It also
provides for a constitutional court as well as a national high court and court
of appeal. It specifies in some detail the powers of constitutional courts, and
it provides frameworks for public administration and the security services,
including the armed forces and the police. It makes brief provision concerning
the status of treaties and customary international law. It has a separate chapter
(Chapter 10) entitled “Public Administration,” which sets out “basic values
and principles governing public administration” and creates a Public Service
Commission accountable to the National Assembly, and it recognises the
existence of political parties.171
For present purposes, the most noteworthy provisions are: sections 32,
33 and 34 in Chapter 2: Bill of Rights; sections 55(2) and 173; and Chapter
9.172 Section 32 creates a constitutional right of access to information held by
the government;173 and section 34 creates a right of access to a court or other
“independent and impartial tribunal or forum” for the resolution of legal
disputes.174 Section 33 creates a right “to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair,” and provides that “everyone whose rights
have adversely affected by administrative action has a right to be given written
reasons.”175 The duty to give effect to these rights is laid on the national
legislature, which must “provide for the review of administrative action by a
court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal” and
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“promote and efficient administration.”176 Section 173, headed “Inherent
Power,” empowers the national courts (amongst other things) “to develop the
common law, taking into account the interests of justice.”177
The aggregate effect of these provisions is to give citizens a
constitutional guarantee of lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair treatment
by the administration, a right to reasons, and a guarantee that legislation will
be enacted to provide for access to a court or tribunal for review of
administrative action. The constitution also empowers the courts to elaborate
these guarantees in common law. Thus, the Constitution establishes three
sources of “administrative law”: the Constitution itself, statutory law, and
common law. The Constitution prevails over statutory and common law
(Section s 1(c) and 2), and (applying the fundamental, unwritten constitutional
principle implicit in Section 1: “The Republic of South Africa is a democratic
state founded . . . on the rule of law”) statute prevails over common law.
Nevertheless, the co-existence of three sources of law has been described by
a leading scholar as a “mistake.”178
Section 55(2) requires the National Assembly to “provide for
mechanisms (a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national
sphere of government are accountable to it; and (b) to maintain oversight of
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation
of legislation; and (ii) any organ of state.”179
Chapter 9 is entitled “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional
Democracy.”180 It establishes six institutions including a Public Protector, an
Auditor General and an Electoral Commission.181 These institutions, says
section 181(2), are “independent . . . and they must be impartial and must
exercise their functions and perform their powers without fear, favour or
prejudice.”182 They are accountable to the National Assembly (s 181(5)).183
176
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The institutions established by Chapter 9 have been called “hybrid
institutions.”184 This name indicates that they share with courts the
characteristic of “independence” even though they do not perform
traditionally judicial functions. Their role, it has been said, is not to enforce
the law against government but rather to ensure that government acts with
“integrity.” Integrity is a much broader concept than legality: acting illegally
is a form of acting without integrity, but there may be many other forms
including, for instance, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, “maladministration” and
incivility.
Some scholars have suggested that such non-judicial, integritypromoting-and-protecting institutions should be conceptualised as
constituting an “integrity branch” of government,185 sitting alongside the
judicial branch and concerned particularly with integrity in public
administration. Proliferation of such institutions in the second half of the
twentieth century and consequent diversion of attention away from judicial
review to non-judicial review of administrative action, has been more
common in parliamentary regimes than in presidential systems. 186 These
developments may be explained as products of transformations and
reinterpretations of the maxi-state undertaken since the 1980s to satisfy neoliberal, economic and political principles and aspirations, expressed in ideas
and initiatives such as “new public management” (NPM) and “third-party
government.”187
If we think of a constitution as expressing a polity’s deepest and most
enduring values and commitments, constitutionalisation of such institutional
innovations signals a belief that they are of fundamental social and political
importance. More generally, the South African Constitution traces at least
some of the changes discussed in this paper. However, it is, as yet, hard to
find constitutional updating reflected in scholarly theorising about public law
in ways that would be necessary to provide sound legal and constitutional
184
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accounts of contemporary phenomena such as modern executive primacy and
populism. As yet, we lack theoretical foundations for modifying constitutional
design to meet challenges to liberty and equality presented by such
phenomena.
XII. CONCLUSION
In the early eighteenth century, a French aristocrat visited England and,
later, composed a stylised and idealised account of what he had seen. The
account was driven by a then-very-widespread aspiration to promote
individual liberty188 and by the author’s desire to strengthen the French
aristocracy against the French monarchy by turning a system of “absolute”
monarchical power into an aristocratic republic. Montesquieu’s analysis of the
English system caught the imagination of the right people at the right time.
More than two centuries later, it still provides the mainframe for constitutional
and public law thought despite the fact that practices of politics have changed
radically in the past three hundred years, as have our aspirations for and
expectations of government and governance. This article has aimed to track
such changes and to analyse their impact on and implications for
constitutional law and theory. Put bluntly, the argument has been that, the
foundations of constitutional law and theory, having been laid in a period of
constitutional exception, no longer fit the world they serve to frame.
Imagine, if you can, that you are a twenty-first-century Montesquieu.
The universal value is no longer liberty as such, but democratic liberty, which
has a good dose of equality thrown in. No longer is there only one polity in
the world that espouses liberal democracy as its foundational value. Choose a
system that, in your mind, is best designed to realise your ideal of liberal
democracy. Observe and describe that system. Next, explain why you think
your chosen system is the best-designed to realise your ideal of liberal
democracy by comparing it with other systems. What are the features of the
system that give it the edge in promoting liberal democracy?
Lastly, attempt to fit your picture into the classical public-law frame
without resorting to drastic Procrustean expedients (please forgive the mixing
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of metaphors).189 In case of failure, try to design a frame (or a bed) into which
your picture will fit. Good luck!

In the Greek myth, Procrustes removed people’s limbs in order to make them fit into his bed. Hence
the term “Procrustean bed.”
189
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